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ABSTRACT 
The role of the media in society is an important consideration for policymakers and 
analysts when creating and implementing policies.  In the Middle East, the Arab media’s 
role in society has emerged as a crucial concern for U.S. policymakers who examine its 
potential to aid in social and democratic movements.  The media provides the means to 
connect democratic movements to the both the masses and to the regimes in power; it is 
an important communication channel.  The Middle East, despite the increase in the 
number of media outlets since 1991, has yet to experience a systemic change towards 
democracy or generate viable social movement organizations.  Why has the media not 
promoted democracy in the Middle East as it has in other parts of the world?  By 
comparing the relevant aspects of social movement theory and democratic media theory 
with the issues and events being covered by the Arab media, I demonstrate the Arab 
media does not provide viable support for sustained social movements or democracy.  
Specifically, I argue that the media has not aided the critical relationship between social 
movement organizations and democratic development due to the nature of its audience 
and subsequent focus on regional and pan-Arab issues.  This is not to suggest that Arabs 
are indifferent towards democracy or local issues; rather, pan-Arabism is a significant 
consideration for the media due to the audience structure of the non-censored media in 
the Arab world. 
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I. THE ARAB MEDIA: LOCALIZING ITS DEMOCRATIC 
POTENTIAL 
A. IMPORTANCE OF MEDIA 
The role of the media in society is an important consideration for policymakers 
and analysts when creating and implementing policies.  The U.S. Department of State’s 
Strategic Plan demonstrates the policy importance of the media and addresses its role and 
value in sustaining civil society, communicating U.S. culture and diplomacy abroad, and 
influencing democratic development.1  In the Middle East, the Arab media’s role in 
society has emerged as a crucial concern for U.S. policymakers, who accuse the media of 
fomenting anti-Americanism.2  Additionally, analysts examine the media’s potential to 
aid in social and democratic movements in the Arab region.  President Barack Obama’s 
2010 National Security Strategy recognizes that the media is a critical component to 
“ensuring that the social and economic needs and political rights of people in [the Middle 
East]… are met.”3  In mainstream media theory, the media serves as an integral link 
between social movements and democracy, and provides the necessary resources to 
create and sustain both types of organizations.4  The Middle East, despite the increase in 
the number of media outlets since 1991, has yet to experience a systemic change towards 
democracy or generate viable social movement organizations.  Why has the media not 
promoted democracy in the Middle East as it has in other parts of the world?  Instead of 
some cultural aversion to democracy, the relationship between the media, democracy, and 
social movements that cause Middle East media difficulty in playing a democracy-
                                                 
1 State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development, “Strategic Plan: Fiscal Years 
2007–2012,” May 2007, http://www.state.gov/s/d/rm/rls/dosstrat/2007. 
2 Bill Sammon, “Bush Press Secretary Rips Arab Press,” The Washington Times, April 11, 2002, 
LexisNexis Academic, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic/. 
3 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, May 2010, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
4 Miklos Sukosd, “Democratic Transformation and the Mass Media in Hungary: From Stalinism to 
Democratic Consolidation,” in Democracy and the Media: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Richard 
Gunther and Anthony Mughan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 144–146; Erik C. Nisbet, 
“Media Use, Democratic Citizenship, and Communication Gaps in a Developing Democracy,” 
International Journal of Public Opinion Research 20, no. 4 (2008): 454–462. 
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supporting role.  Specifically, I argue that the media has not aided the critical relationship 
between social movement organizations and democratic development due to the nature of 
its audience and subsequent focus on regional and pan-Arab issues.  
The media played a significant role in the formation and development of 
meaningful democracy in the West.  The development of the print media in Western 
Europe during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created a formalized institution to 
act as a ‘watchdog’ to emerging democratic governments for its citizens.  A similar role 
for the Arab media, however, has not emerged.  Despite numerous media outlets in the 
region, the Arab media has not evolved to play the same role as its Western counterpart.  
The influence and control of the terrestrial and domestic media by Arab governments has 
historically stifled any function of media as a fourth estate, which is an important element 
in the formation and development of democratic institutions.  The appearance of an 
independent, transnational media and satellite television since 1995, that challenged the 
message presented by the state-controlled media institutions, have encouraged 
informative and enlightened debate and discussion among an Arab audience in ways 
similar to Western media systems, without, however, the social movement and 
democratic results of those Western countries.   
The emergence of a transnational media in the Middle East—one which is 
shattering the taboos, traditions, and purpose of its terrestrial counterpart—is causing 
many to consider the media’s role in generating significant pressure on Arab regimes to 
establish democracy in the region.5  In this thesis, however, I argue that the Arab media’s 
coverage of regional and pan-Arab affairs ignores the issues and grievances that 
traditionally mobilize and sustain social movement activity.  In turn, this lack of social 
movement activity does not aid democratic activism.  This regional focus is due to the 
nature of the media in the Arab world, which are either transnational media or censored 
                                                 
5 Madeline Albright and Vin Weber, “The Right Path to Arab Democracy,” The Washington Post, 
June 8, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/06/08/AR2005060800354.html; Robin Wright, “Al-Jazeera Puts Focus on 
Reform; Mideast Coverage by Network Reviled in Washington is Boon for Bush,” The Washington Post, 
May 8, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A45555-2005May8.html; BBC Summary of 
World Broadcasts, Analysis: Al- Jazeera—TV Channel or Force for Arab Reform?, July 15, 2004, 
LexisNexis Academic, http://www.lexisnexis.com.libproxy.nps.edu/hottopics/lnacademic. 
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national media.  The reasons for regional coverage in the Arab media are two-fold.  First, 
regional and pan-Arab coverage connects Arabs across the Middle East to common issues 
and concerns; the media is catering to audience demand because the audience is regional, 
not national or local due to national censorship laws.  National issues will not interest an 
audience that includes Egypt, Algeria, and Saudi Arabia—only common Arab issues will.  
Second, Arab regimes permit coverage of regional issues—Iraq, Israel, U.S. foreign 
policy—over thorny local issues including democratic demands, because such issues 
divert attention away from local problems.  By investigating social movement theory, I 
demonstrate that there are specific issues and events that must be communicated across 
populations in order to successfully connect affected people or groups together in the 
pursuit of democratic goals.  Through examination of both social movement theory and 
democratic media theory, I demonstrate that there is a critical link between social 
movements, the media, and democratic activism.  Social movements provide the 
necessary resources, skills, and associations to facilitate democratic activism.  The media 
provides the means to connect democratic movements to both the masses and to the 
regimes in power; it is an important communication channel.  In the Middle East, 
however, the media does not serve in this capacity because the regional issues and events 
communicated by the transnational media are a product of both the market desires of a 
large pan-Arab audience and the pervasiveness of the pan-Arab frame.  Therefore, by 
comparing the relevant aspects of social movement theory and democratic media theory 
with the issues and events being covered by the Arab media, I demonstrate the Arab 
media does not provide viable support for sustained social movements or democracy.  
This is not to suggest that Arabs are indifferent towards democracy or local issues; rather, 
pan-Arabism is a significant consideration for the media due to the audience structure of 
the non-censored media in the Arab world. 
B. LITERATURE REVIEW OF THE ARAB MEDIA 
Until recently, the scholarly literature on the origins, development, and role of the 
media in the Middle East was significantly lacking.  Most of the literature contained a 
heavily Western-focused analysis and lacked insight into the both the origins of the Arab 
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media and its potential as a transformative medium.  With the emergence of transnational 
media outlets—such as al Jazeera—and their ability to stimulate debate among audiences 
in the Middle East, however, the Arab media literature deficit is rapidly changing.  
William A. Rugh provides a historical analysis of the various factors that have shaped the 
development of the Arab media in the region.  His analysis provides an in-depth 
perspective on the evolution of Arab media in the region’s post-independence period and 
its co-existence with Arab regimes and governments.  While Rugh addresses the lack of a 
watchdog role as one of the failings of the Arab language media, he does not elaborate or 
speak to the potential for the emergence of a fourth estate function.6  Although his work 
concentrates mostly on the inherent problems—economic, social, and political—within 
the Arab media, it does provide a necessary foundation for understanding the media’s 
origins and its sustained relationship with Arab governments within the region’s political 
environment. 
A second important work on the Arab language media, by Marc Lynch, addresses 
the impact of transnational broadcasting within the region.  Lynch’s detailed work 
focuses on the impact of the transnational communication sector—specifically, al 
Jazeera—and its development of an Arab public sphere in the region.  Central to Lynch’s 
argument is an understanding of the development of the public sphere as proposed by 
Jurgen Habermas.  In his work on the development of the public sphere in Western 
Europe, Habermas argued that the coffee houses and salons of seventeenth and eighteenth 
century Europe were the venues that formalized public debate and discussion, ranging 
initially from art and literature to, eventually, politics and society.7  The net impact of 
these venues was three-fold; they introduced “a kind of social intercourse that… 
disregarded status altogether,” developed a dialogue in areas previously not questioned, 
and established a means by which the public could participate in the workings of society 
                                                 
6 William A. Rugh, Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics (Westport, 
CT: Praeger Publishing, 2004), 10–11. 
7 Jurgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry in a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1989), 
32–33. 
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and government.8  A public discourse, similar to the one that emerged in Western Europe 
and helped with the democratic transition, has failed to materialize in the Middle East.  
As Lynch points out, “the mobilizational media characteristic of authoritarian Arab 
states… [were] the antitheses of a public sphere, with a single voice driving out all 
dissent, question, and political reason.”9  The legacy of the traditional role of the Arab 
media continues to stifle its role in enhancing civil society and encouraging democracy. 
The introduction of satellite communication technologies, however, challenges 
the Arab states monopoly over the communication channels.  Much in the way print 
media excited discussions in the coffee houses and salons of Europe, satellite television 
and the “political arguments” of its programming has created and sustained what Lynch 
terms “an Arab public sphere.”10  While his book focuses mostly on the relationships 
between Al Jazeera, Iraq, and Arab politics, Lynch suggests that expectations and actions 
of the emerging “new Arab public” is providing the foundations for “a more liberal, 
pluralist politics rooted in a vocal, critical public sphere.”11  A key component of Lynch’s 
argument is the emergence of a new political environment, which, among others, holds 
the potential for a regional or transnational media to assume the role of fourth estate.  
Much in the literature focuses on the space being created by the innovative and new 
programming featured on such networks as al Jazeera.  Al Jazeera’s popularity—and 
notoriety—stems from it being “witheringly critical of Arab regimes as it is opposed to 
certain pillars of American foreign policy,” which has helped to create a discourse among 
Arab audiences.12  While this newly created space is important, little attention has been 
given to the media’s content as it relates to benefiting specific social movements and 
democratic activism.  While the emergence of a new political environment is a central 
                                                 
8 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry in a Category of 
Bourgeois Society, 36–37. The print media was an integral part of this process as it injected the topical 
content for debate and discussion. 
9 Marc Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public: Iraq, Al-Jazeera, and Middle East Politics Today, 
(New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2006), 32. For a detailed explanation of the mobilizational 
characteristics of the Arab press, see Chapters 2 and 3 in Rugh’s Arab Mass Media. 
10 Ibid., 41. 
11 Ibid., 2–3. 
12 Marc Lynch, “Watching al-Jazeera,” The Wilson Quarterly 29, no. 3 (2005): 36–37. 
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component to the rise of the fourth estate, the location of the issues and grievances that 
the media—whether terrestrial or transnational—addresses becomes the foundation for 
sustained, productive social movements in which they are able to engage and shape a 
favorable, democratic environment.    
C. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
AND THE MEDIA  
Social movement organizations and the media share a unique and often beneficial 
relationship.  The media can provide social movements advertising, communication, 
protection, public space, and recruitment.  Social movements, in turn, provide the media 
with information, counter-narratives to events, and alternatives to mainstream opinion.  
The media also creates the medium for social movements to communicate and force 
transactions between various actors on both sides.  In certain political, economic, and 
social environments, the “transaction between movements and media [becomes] a 
negotiation over meaning” and, ultimately, “a struggle over framing.”13 The media also 
presents an opportunity for social movement organizations to expand membership and 
broadcast their issues across a wider audience.  These opportunities are essential to 
“reducing the isolation of movements for political change… by facilitating detours 
around obstructions created by governments.”14  Consequently, the relationship between 
the media and an organization is crucial.  Social movement organizations must learn to 
work in such environments and develop strategies that will allow them to effectively 
compete and communicate within the existing media structure.   
Why is the media important to social movements?  The ability of a movement to 
effectively communicate its message is essential to its credibility, sustainment, and 
viability as an organization.  The movement’s message is not only communicated across 
audiences—both participants and non-participants—but by addressing the movement’s 
message, the media can legitimate both the cause and the organization.  The media also 
                                                 
13 William A. Gamson and Gadi Wolfsfeld, “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems,” Annals 
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, no. 528 (July 1993), 117–118. 
14 Philip Seib, “New Media and Prospects for Democratization,” in New Media and the New Middle 
East, ed. Philip Seib (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), 2.  
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has the ability to influence attitudes and opinions.  While researching American attitudes 
toward public opinion, Iyengar and Hinder found that the “problems that receive 
prominent attention on the national news” are often regarded by the viewing public as the 
nation’s most important issues.15  The media also creates space for debate, discussion, 
and dialogue among a variety of different actors.  This space is a critical element for the 
creation of a public sphere, which “functions as an intermediary between the political 
regime and society.”16   
Are social movements important to the media?  The intuitive answer may be no; 
with numerous conflicts, regional developments, and other issues the media are often 
consumed with events.  The exchange between social movement organizations and the 
media, however, is a necessary and important transaction between the two entities.  In 
order for the media to be viewed as an independent and reliable source of information, 
they must cover both sides of the issues.  In developed and democratic societies, where 
there is a great deal of media freedom, the media becomes a reliable source of 
information and public opinion while “in authoritarian systems where many people 
mistrust state-controlled media.”17  Presentation of alternate frames of information or 
episodes, which is provided by social movements, increases the media’s credibility, 
journalistic integrity, and legitimates itself with its audience, as well as proving viable to 
operate as a ‘watchdog’ organization.  In authoritarian environments, however, this is not 
an easy task to accomplish.  Failure to participate in this process leads to accusations of 
bias and regime cooptation.   
 D. ROADMAP  
The issues and events that Arab media organizations choose to cover do not 
support democratic transition, social movement activity, or serve as a watchdog to the 
                                                 
15 Shanto Iyengar and Donald R. Kinder, News That Matters: Television and American Opinion 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 16.   
16 Carola Richter, “The Effects of Islamist Media on the Mainstream Press in Egypt,” in Arab Media: 
Power and Weakness, ed. Kai Hafez (New York, NY: Continuum International Publishing, 2008), 46. 
17 Kai Hafez, “Introduction,” in Arab Media: Power and Weakness, ed. Kai Hafez (New York, NY: 
Continuum International Publishing, 2008), 8. 
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governments or regimes in power.  While the transnational media was instrumental in the 
creation of public space and continues to provide a viable forum to debate issues and 
events that unite and define the Arab community, their inability to cover localized 
grievances and issues—whether due to market demand, intervention by Arab regimes, or 
other barriers—has stagnated the prospects of bringing democracy to the region.  
Through examination of social movement theory, I will demonstrate that localized issues 
and grievances directly influence a movement’s ability to effectively engage in 
democratic activism.  Additionally, I will show that a critical link exists between social 
movements, the media, and democracy.  The intent of this thesis is to help highlight the 
importance of localized issues vis-à-vis social movement organizations and explain the 
Arab media’s deficiency in its coverage.    
In Chapter II, I investigate theories involving the roles of media in democratic and 
non-democratic societies.  A brief history of the Arab media is also presented in order to 
provide an outline of the challenges and impediments towards meeting democratic 
expectations in the region.  Discussion of these theories and exploration of the evolving 
media in the Middle East are essential to understanding the potential of the Arab media 
and how it could succeed in transforming itself into a viable and credible media outlet 
with respect to democratic activism.    
In Chapter III, I examine many of the leading social movement theories with 
respect to explaining how and why people assemble, form, and engage in civic and social 
activism.  These theories, as well as an exploration of the components of collective 
activism, demonstrate the necessary elements to initiating and sustaining social 
movements that benefit democratic activism.  This will provide the theoretical framework 
for understanding how social movement organizations in the Middle East can effectively 
operate in the Arab media environment. 
In Chapter IV, I present the connections, interactions, and complications among 
Arab media outlets, social movement organizations, and democracy.  Successful social 




organizations and civil society can successfully operate in various media environments.  
With this as a background, I will then explain why current Arab media systems will not 
support or sustain viable democratic activism or social movement activity.  
In the final chapter, I will summarize my research and identify some of the 
potential criticisms my research may encounter.  For example, the expansion and impact 
of the internet and social media outlets report and frame issues different from the 
mainstream media outlets.  I will address these types of issues and highlight the 
importance of the current research and my findings.   
 10
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II. ARAB MEDIA 
In this chapter, I explore the role of the media in political environments.  The 
literature on the media’s role in a government or society is broad and plentiful, with 
ample scholarly material focusing on the watchdog functions that the media performs in a 
democratic society.  Material specifically addressing the potential prospect for media to 
perform a watchdog role in non-democratic regimes or societies, in comparison, is 
significantly limited due to the fact that the media freedoms are suppressed in such 
regimes or that the state owns the media.  In order to understand how the media can 
benefit social movement organizations and their efforts to facilitate democratic activism, 
it is important to examine and understand the characteristics, traits, structures and 
shortcomings of the media found in both democratic societies and non-democratic 
governments.  First, the role of the media in democratic societies will be explored; 
specifically, the divisions in the literature with respect to the media’s role and its 
strengths and weaknesses.  Second, the origins and development of the Arab media is 
evaluated in order to understand its current function in Arab regimes.  The recent 
development of a vibrant regional Arab media is also examined in order to understand 
how it compares—and differs—from its domestic counterpart.  Finally, I conclude with a 
brief analysis of the Arab media as whole and determine where it is currently situated in 
the Middle East media landscape.  This analysis is important because it defines the 
media’s role and purpose in society and how it may facilitate—and sustain—democratic 
activism.  Additionally, the various influences that shaped the development of the Arab 
media are addressed in order to provide insight into why it does not support social 
movements or democratic development. 
A. ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN SOCIETY   
What is the media’s role in a democratic society?  According to scholars, the 
media plays a critical role in the establishment and maintenance of regimes.  In Western 
democracies, the media—arguably—serves as an independent organization responsible 
for keeping its citizens involved in the democratic process.  Katrin Voltmer suggests that 
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there are three influences that “established the normative justification of the political role 
of the media in western democracies… diversity and the ‘marketplace of ideas’, 
information and enlightened citizenship, and public watchdog and government 
accountability.”18  More succinctly, it provides information to citizens so that they may 
“make responsible, informed choices” while at the same time providing the means to 
serve as a “checking function” for elected officials who represent them.19  Julianne 
Schultz notes that the media roles created in the nineteenth century—“public forum for 
debate about the issues of the day; to articulate public opinion and to force governments 
to consider the will of the people”—continue to shape and define today’s media and 
“remain central to contemporary definitions of the role of the press today.”20  The media, 
therefore, provides a forum to educate and enlighten the public while serving as the 
communication link between the government and its citizenry.  This is critical to 
establishing and sustaining democracy as “the role of the press [is] to disseminate 
information as a way of mediating between the state and all facets of civil society.”21  
The media’s role as a watchdog or fourth estate for society is often cited as an 
essential function.  The watchdog role refers to the media’s ability to provide citizens 
information on the performance of their government by informing on the actions of 
elected officials, serving as a ‘check’ to the various branches of governments, reporting 
on military actions and foreign policy decisions, and protecting the public’s interests.22  
John B. Thompson notes that the media’s ‘watchdog’ role was created on a view that a 
                                                 
18 Katrin Voltmer, “The Mass Media and the Dynamics of Political Communication in Processes of 
Democratization: An Introduction,” in Mass Media and Political Communication in New Democracies, ed. 
Katrin Voltmer (New York: Routledge Publishing, 2006), 5. 
19 U.S. Agency for International Development, The Role of Media in Democracy: A Strategic 
Approach (Washington, DC: GPO, 1999), 3. 
http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnace630.pdf. 
20 Julianne Schultz, Reviving the Fourth Estate: Democracy, Accountability and the Media 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 30. 
21 USAID, Role of Media in Democracy, 3. 
22 Thomas E. Patterson, “The United States: News in a Free-Market Society,” in Democracy and the 
Media: A Comparative Perspective, ed. Richard Gunther and Anthony Mughan (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2000), 248–249; Bartholomew H. Sparrow, Uncertain Guardians: The News Media as a 
Political Institution (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 1–4; Philip Seib, “Politics of 
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“free and independent press was a vital safeguard against the despotic use of state 
power.”23  There are influences, however, that can interfere with the ‘watchdog’ function 
and the democratic roles of the media.  In the United States, for example, the 
“commercial and adversarial orientation of the… news media profoundly affect political 
coverage, mainly in ways that reduce the media’s capacity as instruments of public 
information and debate.”24  While there are valid criticisms of the media and as it 
continues to evolve, the basic concept and role of the fourth estate remains critical in 
democratic societies.  Julianne Schultz describe the fourth estate as “a crucial political 
institution, intimately connected to the concerns and preoccupations of its readers” and 
one of “the original imperatives of the press.”25   
What roles do the media play in an authoritarian setting?  The term ‘authoritarian’ 
could be used to describe a very particular political system; for the purpose of this thesis, 
it used to describe any political system or regime that is generally characterized as non-
democratic.  The media in such cases serves a function as a voice for the ruling elites in 
these types of political environments.  It is often used by those in power to influence the 
population on a chosen message.  In Nazi Germany, for example, the media—press, 
radio, and film—was used as “an instrument of Goebbels’ comprehensive propaganda 
machine” to broadcast the regime’s message.26  The media becomes the means by which 
authorities communicate to the masses; however, it is a one-way communication 
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information “with the objective of forming and manipulating nonelite [sic] attitudes and 
behaviors.”27  Ultimately, the “degree of repression” by the state will determine the 
media’s role and influence in societal and political affairs.28 
B. MEDIA STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESS 
How effective is the media at performing watchdog roles in society?  Given the 
depth of material, scholars debate not only the media’s responsibility in society but its 
effectiveness at performing many of these functions.  The literature is divided into two 
camps; those that see media as fulfilling its responsibility to society and those that are 
critical.  While both camps generally acknowledge the necessity of some degree of media 
reform, the dispute occurs in the current capacity and capability of the media to perform a 
watchdog role.  Further analysis of these fault lines is essential in order to understand 
how the media benefit a social movement organization’s ability to promote democratic 
activism.   
Why do the media fail to perform its watchdog role in a democratic society?  
These critics place the blame of the failure upon the ownership and globalization as the 
principle culprits associated with the ailing media’s demise in a democracy.  With respect 
to ownership, many view the private and corporate control of the media as a significant 
impediment to meaningful democracy.  Robert W. McChesney argues that private control 
has led to a weak political culture where business and commercial interests determine 
media content that subsequently undermines meaningful government and democracy.29  
Reflecting on many of Jurgen Habermas’ concepts, McChesney points to the rise of the 
corporate media and its dependence on advertising and circulation revenue as a primary 
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cause for the elimination of diversity and debate within the media.  Ultimately, without 
diversity, the press cannot effectively assume its historical and necessary position of 
watchdog for a democratic society.  Thompson further echoes this sentiment by 
explaining that the “traditional liberal theory of the free press” is undermined by the 
media’s dependence on the “highly competitive and increasingly global process of capital 
accumulation.”30  Thompson is also critical of the state’s increasing intervention, in both 
the media and in society, under the guise of regulating obscenity or in the interests of 
national security.31  Additionally, the increasing costs of media production, coupled with 
the dependence and accumulation of advertising revenue, constrains the creation and 
availability of alternate venues and opinions.  These costs have stifled mediums that 
operate outside of the mainstream media, which often present an alternative frame or 
debate to the public.  Consequently, it is the elite media, which is commonly referred to 
as the “mainstream media” or “mass media,” that chooses how to frame issues to the 
public, which “serves the interests of state and corporate power… in a manner supportive 
of established privilege and limiting debate and discussion accordingly.”32 
Is the media preserving and performing its role as watchdog in a democratic 
society?  Those in this camp generally argue that the media is effectively performing its 
intended role as a watchdog on the government for its constituents.  Many within this 
literature point to the ‘muckraking’ episodes of the early twentieth century, the Vietnam 
War, Watergate, the civil rights movement, and other significant media events during the 
twentieth century as proof of the mass media’s fulfillment of its watchdog role.  
Numerous counter-arguments are presented to the notion that the media is ailing due to 
globalization and corporate ownership.  Diversity of commercial media, despite 
ownership, for example, provides viewers numerous choices of outlets, diversity of 
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opinions and debate, and a better overall product.33  Many within this camp also point out 
that the excessive control owners and publishers exercised in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century’s has significantly declined with the increased media markets.  Further, 
the progression of the press in the latter decades of the twentieth century suggests that 
owners and publishers are “more apt to be criticized for oversimplifying than 
partisanizing the news.”34   
Does the media’s presentation of news and events influence the way the public 
views or processes particular issues?  The media’s coverage of issues and events is an 
important determinant in how people develop opinions with regards to government 
policy, local and national affairs, and the actions of public officials.  Iyengar and Kinder 
suggest problems or events “become high priority political issues for the public only if 
they first become high priority news items for the networks.35  The media prioritizes 
issues and shapes public opinion through a variety of methods.  For example, the media 
influences public opinion through agenda-setting, which consists of the deliberate 
placement of news stories in its broadcasts (e.g. the lead story), the editing of news 
coverage to reflect a certain position, and utilizing the personal or shared experiences of 
the audience to help highlight a particular national issue.36  The news story selection may 
be based on commercial or political interests.  For instance, the story may be selected 
because its gets attention due to being sensationalistic.  Additionally, the public’s 
assignment of responsibility for various societal problems, national issues, or events is 
directly related to the media’s framing of news coverage, which Iyengar terms as 
“framing effects.”37  As such, episodic frames—or news coverage featuring specific 
events or stories—generally results in accountability being placed on victims or 
                                                 
33 Benjamin Compaine, “Global Media,” Foreign Policy, no. 133 (November–December 2002): 22.  
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36 Ibid., 112–114. 
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perpetrators, while thematic frames—coverage based on generalized or non-specific 
events—results in responsibility being place on society.38  These practices, coupled with 
the media choice to focus on certain issues while overlooking others, ultimately “shape 
the… public’s political priorities.”39  Consequently, the media has significant influence 
on the public’s perception of issues and events and is subject to the market and the 
owner’s intent and point of view.  Despite its influences and criticisms, the media plays 
an important role in the establishment and sustainment of democracy.  While scholars 
debate the impacts of these influences on the media’s continued ability to effectively 
perform its watchdog role, the media serves an important role for democratic societies.  
The Arab media, however, has yet to develop a similar democratic role.  While Arab 
journalists, editors, and media outlets attempt to perform a watchdog role by providing 
critical coverage of their governments, Arab regimes continue to imprison or fine those 
who criticize policy.  For example,—in February 2010, two journalists were jailed for 
criticizing Jordanian foreign policy40—assess court decisions,—in March 2008, five 
journalists jailed for “insulting the judiciary and commenting on its rulings”41—or report 
on government corruption—in May 2010, an Egyptian journalist was charged for 
commenting on government corruption and domestic policies.42  Examination of the 
Arab media’s origins, influences, and development will provide insight into why the Arab 
media does not support democratic development.  
C. ORIGINS OF THE ARAB MEDIA 
What are the origins of the Arab media?  The development of the domestic Arab 
media was a result of the political and economic transitions experienced during the 
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colonial and post-independence periods in the Middle East.  Control of the press was 
important in these fragile social and political environments as colonial governments 
imposed censorship laws on Arab journalists, required newspapers to apply for licenses, 
and—as in the case of the Maghrib—mandated that they adopt the colonial language and 
customs.43  While colonial governments recognized the need for a press, they viewed its 
role only as a means to communicate to “officials in their local administration [the 
various] laws and regulations imposed from abroad.”44  Despite the measures imposed by 
colonial governments, and recognizing “the power of the press as a political mobilization 
instrument and a means of disseminating their political and ideological beliefs,” Arab 
journalists began to use the press to communicate their views and opinions on their 
nationalist struggles instead of just reporting the news.45  The rise of Arab nationalism in 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century further attracted Arab newspapers to the 
opposition of colonial rule, which, consequently, established a “nationalism/anti-
imperialism theme” in the media, which remains strong today.46  The oppositional nature 
of the Arab press, however, was short-lived.  After independence “the new Arab 
governments saw in the press a potential and a threat: the press’s ability to mobilize 
public opinion… versus its power to menace the ideological foundations of 
government.47  Arab governments continued to apply many of the colonial censorship 
laws and practices to the Arab press and regulated it “so that it promoted the governments 
developmental aims,” which, consequently, turned the press into “a mere mouthpiece for 
national governments.”48  The impact of these developments was that Arab governments 
recognized that the “press was a powerful weapon and they sought to monopolize it.”49      
The social and economic environment also influenced the development of the 
Arab media.  The costs to establish, operate, and sustain newspapers was substantial and 
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impacted the amount and variety of Arab newspapers.  Arab countries consisting of small 
populations, with low incomes and poor literacy rates, inhibited advertising revenues and 
circulation for most publishers while simultaneously creating a dependence on 
subsidies.50  High illiteracy rates coupled with low advertising revenues “forced 
newspapers to depend for their survival on subsidies from various political factions, who 
in return saw in the press an extended channel to promote their principles.”51  While this 
resulted in a brief period of highly partisan and political Arab newspapers upon 
independence, which, as Rugh acknowledges, resembled many features of the American 
press following the American Revolution, this was short lived as Arab governments soon 
brought them under their control.52  Despite these measures, private and political 
newspapers were able to survive; however, Arab governments took “over the exclusive 
right to patronize the politically important newspapers, excluding political parties and 
other private groups from patronizing them.53   
The development of newer and more expensive technologies—specifically radio 
and television—would further entrench the economic dependence of the media and 
government control.  The introduction of broadcast media abolished the education and 
literacy requirements for information exchanges, which concerned the fragile post-
independence governments with respect to the content and control of information to the 
masses.  This provided regimes with further justification for continued media oversight 
and control.  William A. Rugh points out that after widespread introduction of the 
broadcast radio medium, Arab governments “increased their influence and control over 
the mass media in part with the justification that their newly independent nations [faced] 
overwhelming external and internal problems requiring unity and purposefulness and a 
minimum of dissent in the public debate.”54  As a result, Arab regimes employed the 
electronic media to their advantage.  In Egypt, Syria, and Libya, for example, radio and 
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television were under strict government control and used “as instruments to reach and 
mobilize the mass of the population.”55  In Jordan, Tunisia, and the Gulf States, however, 
the regimes were “less interested in active social engineering of the masses and therefore 
they were less intrigued with the media as tools for social change” but recognized “the 
political importance of the electronic media” and kept it under the control of their 
respective governments.56  While used for different purposes, the end result was the 
same; government oversight of the media. 
How did these origins impact the ownership and control of the Arab media?  The 
Arab media, among other institutions, became increasingly dependent upon government 
subsidizations in the form of funds, benefits, and advertisements.  The rentier system 
established in Arab states, where the “distinction between public service and private 
interest is often blurred,” further exacerbated the situation as government funds became 
the only way most media outlets could survive.57  With the state providing “public goods 
and private favours” without taxation, Arab citizens became “far less demanding in terms 
of political participation” thus minimizing dissent and opposition.58  The cementing of 
government influence and control continued with the development of newer, more 
sophisticated, and expensive technologies, such as radio and television.  Meager Arab 
advertising revenues, which in 1999 represented less than one percent of the entire world 
media revenues, are also partly responsible for the necessity of continued government 
subsidization as the media, even if allowed, lacked the funding to separate and form 
independent news organizations.59  In the fragile, post-independence era in the Middle 
East, newly formed regimes viewed control of information as an essential element to their 
sustainment and stability—this became especially important with the introduction of 
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radio and television.  Since literacy was no longer a requirement to receive, process, and 
transmit information across a broad audience, radio and television increasingly became 
viewed as dangerous communication means by unstable regimes and, subsequently, 
brought this medium under strict government control.  This is significant because 
political participation by citizens is essential for the establishment and sustainment of 
democracy.  The demand for democracy also fuels the media.  The media is critical to 
this process as it serves as the communication link between the people and the authorities 
and provides information so that citizens can make informed choices.  It also, in reverse, 
informs the state of civil demands.  Given the ownership and control patterns stemming 
from the colonial and independence periods, however, the Arab media did not develop 
into an institution capable of performing its democratic role.  At the same time, the lack 
of a social movement and media relationship kept opposition away from the media 
institutions. 
While control of information was viewed as vital to the interests of the various 
regimes of the region, media ownership eventually extended outside the formal control of 
the government and began to expand to individuals, families, and corporations.  While 
privately-owned, the government controlled these media outlets through indirect methods 
in order to ensure “loyalty to the basic policies of the regime and to its top leadership.”60  
These indirect methods included self-censorship, public policy statements, establishment 
of a national news agency to guide private media, and informal or private contact with the 
media to clarify important issues.61  Saudi Arabia, for example, uses a combination of 
strict media laws and “its networks of ownership and informal influence” to ensure that 
coverage is aligned with the regime’s agenda.62  Additionally, regimes established 
bureaucracies and specialized branches of their governments to specifically regulate and 
monitor the ownership, content, and control of the media.  Ministries of information were 
established to regulate and define what could and could not be published or broadcast 
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within the boundaries of acceptability to the state.  While degrees of private ownership 
varied throughout the region and depended upon regime type, government censorship—
whether subtle or overt—pervaded the media and set boundaries and restrictions on the 
content, limits, and accessibility of the medium.    
What was the overall impact of the state’s control and influence on the terrestrial 
Arab media?  Despite government claims that control of information in relation to the 
media was necessary in order to “further the national interest by supporting government 
policies,” the Arab media’s content, prestige, and credibility began to decline in both the 
region and the international community.63  Rugh describes two types of biases that 
appear throughout the Arab press; cultural and political.  Cultural bias is a “medium’s 
particular slant on the news,” which is based on the surrounding “cultural, historic, 
economic, and social environment.”64  While cultural bias is usually unintentional, it is 
nonetheless an important aspect of the Arab media and permeates throughout the 
presentation of the news and is common throughout the region.  Additionally, the Arab 
media provides cultural norms, which they think is most acceptable to the audience.  
Political bias, however, is a conscious function of the Arab media and presents the news 
with respect to “prevailing political factors, such as policies and preferences of the 
government in power.”65  Although political bias occurs in varying degrees across all 
media organizations, its continued presence suggests that an overt relationship exists 
between the media and the state.  This relationship subsequently caused the media, and 
the journalism profession, to come under increased criticism and scrutiny by the Arab 
public.  While Rugh cites low salaries and inadequate training as some of the causes of 
the decline of the journalism profession in the Middle East, the political bias found in the 
media further perpetuates problems within the Arab press.  Additionally, the terrestrial 
media and its presentation of the news are regarded with “a large measure of defensive 
skepticism,” which has lead to declining sales, audience, and reliability.66  Consequently, 
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these developments created a negative perception within the Arab public towards the 
terrestrial media and presented an opportunity for new outlets to provide impartial and 
unbiased delivery of information to the region. 
Government oversight, control, and manipulation of the media are not unique to 
the Middle East; however, the Arab media’s inability to initiate political transformation 
or develop into a functioning fourth estate is due to unique conditions.  While examining 
the role of the media both during and after General Augusto Pinochet’s regime in Chile, 
Eugenio Tironi and Guillermo Sunkel noted the importance of the alternative media’s 
role in transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy.  The Pinochet regime’s 
oversight of the media resembled the characteristics of the Arab media—the 
establishment of formal government institutions to oversee the censorship and control of 
the media and the implementation of policies aimed at the “demobilization and 
depoliticization of the population.”67  Unlike states and societies in the Middle East, 
however, Chilean social and political organizations effectively utilized alternative media 
and alternative solutions to counter and criticize Pinochet’s regime and were integral to 
the democratic transition.68  The Franco regime in Spain also kept tight restrictions on the 
press and media.69  During Spain’s transition to democracy during the 1960s and 1970s, 
the media used “international news events as vehicles for the education of Spaniards 
about the workings and merits of democratic politics” while still operating within existing 
Spanish censorship practices and press laws.70  Government involvement in the media is 
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also present in some democracies, as in the case of the British Broadcasting Corporation 
(BBC), which “was created by royal charter” during the interwar years.71  
Arab states and the alternative media, however, have yet to experience these types 
of developments.  During the Lebanese Civil War, many small media outlets emerged 
and operated “outside any legal framework” and against the state’s media monopoly.72  
Following the war, however, the government implemented restrictive media laws that 
reduced the total number of media outlets through its control of licenses, providing these 
to only those stations “whose major shareholders were politicians or parties that did not 
reject the postwar political system dominated by Syrian tutelage over Lebanon’s political 
life.”73  As a result, the Lebanese government “restricted media pluralism and curtailed 
free expression, particularly as it relates to political reporting and commentary about its 
foreign and domestic policies.”74  In Jordan, the regime used less authoritative strategies 
to deal with oppositional movement and their media.  Islamist movements—primarily, 
the Muslim Brotherhood—and the Jordanian government developed an understanding 
that regarded each “other as a rival to be dealt with politically rather than an implacable 
adversary to be crushed.”75  Muslim Brotherhood periodicals and “newspapers associated 
with the movement” were subjected to strict press laws that were not intended to 
“suppress the Islamic movement but to create a set of shifting red lines and obstructions 
that hampered the operations of Islamist organizations but never prevented them from 
operating.”76  While the oppositional media in Jordan was not crushed, it was effectively 
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marginalized through the regime’s strategy that “oscillated between co-optation and 
repression.”77  Consequently, the Lebanese and Jordanian governments marginalized—or 
eliminated—alternative and oppositional media in different but effective ways.  
Alternative and oppositional media in the Middle East have suffered significant setbacks 
and, subsequently, not aided in democratic development. 
D. DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRANSNATIONAL MEDIA 
What are the origins of the transnational media in the Middle East?  The domestic 
Arab media provided the foundation for a more regionalized flow of information.  The 
stifling economic, political, and social environment in which the terrestrial media 
operated for most of the twentieth century provided a foundation for transnational media 
outlets.  The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provided the impetus for the introduction 
of transnational media in the region, as the “stale, turgid and censored coverage available 
on local Arab stations” could not compete with CNN and other news services covering 
the occupation and the war.78  Additionally, following the Gulf War of 1991, 
transnational media outlets began to appear as a result of reformation policies 
implemented by Arab governments as they “confronted Western prescriptions for 
economic reform and liberalization, involving the sale of state assets and opening of 
markets to private entrepreneurship.”79  These domestic liberalization attempts 
subsequently created an opportunity for the Arab media to provide “limited debates about 
domestic issues.”80  These short-lived reforms and the subsequent “rollback of 
liberalization,” however, became the catalyst for the creation of independent media by 
“displacing political arguments into the transnational arena.”81  
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One such outlet that formed as a result of domestic reformation attempts was the 
al Jazeera network.  Established in the mid-1990s, the network was created when the 
newly crowned Qatari Emir, Hamad Bin Khalifa, instituted a series of policies aimed at 
reforming social, economic, and political policies.82  While not the first transnational 
media outlet in the Middle East, al Jazeera quickly became the most popular and a 
symbol of the potential of this medium and the shifting nature of the Arab transnational 
media.83  Covering regional issues spanning from United States military operations in the 
region to Israeli-Palestinian relations to the undertakings of the al Saud family, the 
network facilitates a variety of topics that provokes debate and discussion across the 
region and the world.  The financial backing provided by the Qatari ruling family to 
cover many of the costs associated with creating and operating the network has blurred 
the lines between government control and private ownership.84  Despite this blur, the 
innovative nature of the network’s programming and content has caused many to 
consider the democratic implications the station—and on a broader scale, the Arab 
transnational media—could have on the region.   
What is the impact of the transnational media?  First, it has created a media 
market where consumers have a choice among information and its sources.  The diversity 
in content and channels has created a situation where “programming does not simply 
meet the needs of the government, but rather actively seeks viewers who enjoy a variety 
of news and entertainment options.”85  Second, the quality and availability of Arab 
journalists have increased.  Live televised debates and other new formats and genres in 
the Arab transnational media have “contributed to the increasing professionalism among 
Arab journalists.”86  Third, the reliability and relative trustworthiness associated with the 
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Arab transnational media has increased.  This credibility extends not only to the Arab’s in 
the region but also to those abroad in the international community.  Sahar Khamis, and 
others, suggests this “could have positive implications on the Arab media’s international 
image and their ability to effectively communicate with the outside world.”87  Finally, the 
creation and emergence of public space for Arabs to discuss and debate issues once 
thought to be taboo.  The “new Arab public,” which Marc Lynch uses to describe the 
public space in the Middle East, “has shattered the state’s monopoly over the flow of 
information, rendering obsolete the ministries of information and the oppressive state 
censorship that was smothering public discourse well into the 1990s.”88  
E. CONCLUSION 
Where is the Arab media currently ‘located’ in the media landscape?  The Arab 
media has long been a controversial source of information in the Middle East.  Subject to 
censorship, political influence, and multiple biases, the terrestrial media of most Arab 
countries has been historically identified as a largely unreliable information network, 
which is often viewed as a mouthpiece for the governments, which either directly—or 
indirectly—control or influence them.  While Arab states have utilized and controlled 
their media organizations for different purposes, the origins, development, and traditional 
role of the terrestrial media has impacted the substance, content, and function of the 
entire Arab media network.  The economic and political development of the terrestrial 
media has subsequently led to the continued censorship and government control of 
information, which has hampered the citizenry’s ability to address grievances and 
establish a meaningful system of democracy.  The Arab media evolved from the 
traditions of the colonial governments prior to independence and continued to develop in 
the authoritarian, non-democratic regimes that characterized the Middle East 
governments of the second half of the twentieth century.   
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The recent development of the transnational media, however, has opened up the 
possibility for different networks of information to be disseminated and debated among 
audiences.  These outlets have created a public space for debate over issues that were 
once considered taboo or banned from formal propagation.  Development of public space 
via the press in Western European societies during the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries have caused speculation over the potential for the Arab media—and specifically 
the transnational media—to develop into a similar role as government watchdog or 
Fourth Estate.  Despite the space the Arab media has created and the efforts of numerous 
Arab journalists, there has been little—if any—progress towards democracy or 
democratic activism.  Additionally, both the Arab terrestrial and transnational media 
outlets have had minimal impact on social movement organizations, which traditionally 
provide the resources, planning, and structure for democratic activism.  This is evident 
especially in authoritarian and quasi-authoritarian regimes where localized issues and 
criticisms of the government are repressed.  In other areas, however, there appears to be 
some progress towards media freedom.  In Iraq and Lebanon, for example, the media 
broadcasts “an array of languages and take up political positions stretching from pro-
government to anti-government, Islamist to communist [while] some are extremely 
partisan, while others are neutral.”89  While these are positive developments for the Arab 
transnational media, journalists and media outlets in these countries still face difficulties.  
The Iraqi government closed the al Arabiya office for “using reports that distort facts and 
that include inaccuracy” leading to the incitement of sectarian violence”90 while 
journalists and correspondents in Lebanon face multiple dangers from various political 
groups and organizations.91  The link between the media and social movement 
organizations is critical for the development of democracy and will be further explored in 
the subsequent chapters.   
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III. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS 
In this chapter, I discuss the importance of social movements and their relation to 
democratic activism.  The study of social movement theory is important to the 
understanding of how organizations endure and operate in various political environments.  
Social movement theory provides explanations for what motivates people to join, 
organize, mobilize, and react to various situations presented by authorities.  In order to 
understand the media’s role in promoting a particular movement’s agenda, it is essential 
to understand how movements function in a given social and political environment.  In 
the first part of this chapter, I will examine four prevailing mobilization theories in order 
to determine the motivation behind the creation and development of social movement 
organizations.  Examination of these theories will provide a common set of elements that 
present an explanation for collective action.  The second part of this chapter will explore 
these elements in depth and explain their importance in social movement organizations.  
These elements will be the foundation for examining the media’s effectiveness in 
promoting a movement’s goals and message.  Finally, I will address the role of social 
movements and civil society in promoting democratic activism.  While social movement 
organizations can promote democratic activism in a variety of political environments, 
they also encounter a variety of significant challenges that can impede progress.  I will 
provide a brief exploration of some the challenges that organizations face in the Middle 
East. 
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORIES OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
There are four prevailing views in social movement theory that suggest various 
motivations for why people organize, protest, and act.  The first, and perhaps oldest 
theory, suggest that people spontaneously gather in a crowd and act excitedly.  This 
theory held that there was no apparent logic, reason, or organization among the crowd 
except for the feeling of frustration created from a particular set of grievances among the 
participants.  Mobs often consisted of a variety of participants who “spontaneously” 
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joined the protest only “if they sympathized with the grievances being expressed.”92  This 
theory postulated that the participants were the poor and marginalized members of 
society who lacked the skill, resources, and organization to effectively take action to 
redress their grievances.  Essentially, this theory postulated that groups of aggrieved 
people came together, without prior coordination, to wildly act upon an injustice or 
grievance.  These episodes became the “mechanisms for alleviating psychological 
discomfort derived from [the] structural strains” of society.93  Over time, however, this 
theory became disproved as it became apparent that sustained protests, and on a larger 
scale, movements, needed more than just angry people to simultaneously and 
spontaneously gather in order to succeed; they needed time, money, resources, 
organization, and skill.  Additionally, the poor and marginalized members of society 
often lacked these pre-requisites and, hence, a new level of analysis was needed to 
explain beyond the spontaneous gathering theory.  
Individual rationality theory emerged as an alternative to the ‘spontaneous mob 
theory’ and attempted to explain in depth why people protest and react to grievances.  
This theory focused mostly on the individuals, or “collectivities considered as if they 
were decision-making individuals,” who made “critical choices… conforming to their 
imputed interests, resources, and situational constraints.”94  Individuals, or small groups 
of people, while driven by a particular injustice or set of grievances, only act in their own 
self interest, which prevents collective action or mobilization on a larger scale.  This 
advanced beyond the ‘spontaneous mob theory’ by conceding that various actors 
provided a minimal amount of organization, resources, and skill to the protest.  
Additionally, theorists accounted for the motives and injustices that impacted aggrieved 
individuals, or groups, in an attempt to expand beyond the mob.  The focus, however,  
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remained upon the actions of the actor or group of actors. Individual rationality theory, 
consequently, did little to explain collective action beyond disconnected groups of people 
acting upon grievances. 
In an attempt to explain mobilization beyond the “grievance-based conceptions” 
of earlier theoretical models, resource mobilization focused “instead on mobilization 
processes and the formal organization manifestations of these processes.”95  Resource 
mobilization emphasizes the organizational and resource capacity of a group and its 
ability to collectively act together.  Shifting focus away from individuals or small groups, 
this theory began to look at the many variables that allowed aggrieved groups to mobilize 
and act collectively towards a common goal instead of focusing primarily on the claims 
that previous theories reasoned for groups acting together.  Quintan Wiktorowicz notes 
that resource mobilization theory holds “movements as rational, organized manifestations 
of collective actions.”96  While he suggests that “grievances are ubiquitous [while] 
movements are not” the role of grievances still is, nonetheless, an important consideration 
in the role of social movements.97  Consequently, resource mobilization theory held that 
only those with the proper time and resources—for example, the middle class—will 
protest, while de-emphasizing the informal bureaucratic activity and grievance-based 
claims that traditionally motivated people to organize and act.   
Finally, a “synthesis” emerged, which combined previous theories through the 
emphasis of “three broad sets of factors [for] analyzing the emergence and development 
of social movements/revolutions;” political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and 
framing process.98  This view holds that movements emerge due to an array of factors, 
which are based on a variety of conditions already present in the environment.  Political 
opportunity refers to “attention on the relationship between the movement organizations 
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and the state” whereby any shift in this relationship may create an opportunity for the 
movement to mobilize.99 Essentially, organized movements will actively seek these 
opportunities and exploit these to their advantage.  Mobilizing structures are the 
“collective vehicles, informal, as well as formal, through which people mobilize and 
engage in collective action.”100  Framing processes are “conscious strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of themselves that 
legitimate and motivate collective action.”101  Consequently, this new synthesis 
deemphasized individual traits of a movement—actors, resources, or space—and instead 
looked at all the variables as a whole.  Therefore, the opportunities, networks, 
institutions, cultures, and ideologies present in an environment all contributed to the way 
in which a movement exists and operates.  
B. COMPONENTS OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
The four views presented on social movement theory offer a variety of reasons as 
to what motivates people to act.  While the theories differ on the causes and motivations 
for protest episodes, they highlight important elements of what brings people together to 
act collectively.  These elements are common across all social movement theories and 
provide the impetus for collective action.  First, there are issues and grievances that effect 
people—whether as individuals or as groups—and presents a sense of injustice.  Without 
these, there is no motivation or need to act.  Second, these issues are identified and 
advertised to both an otherwise unknowing or uninformed public and to the aggressors or 
those who are providing the oppression.  This not only serves to identify the grievances 
but also to serve notice to those who are responsible for the injustices.  Third, grievances 
must be localized and have a direct impact upon the population.  Grievances must have 
an impact on people in order for them to consider action.  Finally, the effectiveness of an 
organization is directly related to its ability to successfully manage its resources, 
communicate its message, and act collectively together as a movement.  The acts of  
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individuals or poorly resourced organizations will be ineffective to accomplishing their 
goals.  Therefore, the success of social movement organizations depends on their ability 
to effectively employ these elements.  
The first necessary element in social movement theory is the grievances, or the 
perceived sense of injustices that effect people.  The role and impact of grievances on 
movements and movement participation is debated throughout the Social Movement 
Theory literature102; however, grievances are nonetheless a necessary component for 
collective action as it often serves as the inspiration for an organization’s formation and 
development.  There are many reasons why people band together, but Sidney Tarrow 
offers a more precise reason for people participating together for a common purpose.  
According to Tarrow, the reason people will act collectively in social movements “is to 
mount common claims against opponents, authorities, or elites” where “common or 
overlapping interests and values are at the basis of their common actions.”103  The 
grievances or injustices that make up what Tarrow refers to as “common claims” must be 
significant enough to bring people together to confront the usually better equipped and 
better organized authorities.  Grievances must also be experienced and legitimated across 
a constituency in order for the movement to gain and sustain support.  If grievances are 
viewed as trivial or lack popular support, participants will ultimately not take undue risks 
or “sacrifice their time to social movement activity unless they have good reason to do 
so.”104  Ultimately, the potential constituents of a social movement organization must be 
affected by the particular grievance, issue, or concern and perceive it as worth risking 
movement participation.  The impact of a grievance or particular set of grievances on a  
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particular group or population is a critical component within social movements and 
emphasizes that people usually do not join movements or risk protesting over arbitrary or 
unimportant issues.  Grievances must be localized and have a direct impact on the 
population. 
Second, grievances must also be advertised to a knowing or, otherwise, 
unknowing public.  An integral component of an effective movement strategy is 
communicating to an audience.  The communication, or advertising, of grievances occurs 
simultaneously across two separate and different audiences.  They need to be aired 
internally, “among social movement organizers and movement participants,” and 
externally, to the “broader public composed of adherents, bystanders, elites, and 
opponents.”105  Internal communication is necessary to spread information, plans, and 
instructions across organizational members, in order to strengthen the core supporters of 
the movement.  The external component is equally important as it provides an 
opportunity for a movement to persuade bystanders to join their cause, advertise and 
market their injustices, and address authorities with their specific sets of grievances.  It 
allows a particular movement to market their goals to an affected group or populace, 
which increases both the size and strength of the movement.  The media serves as a 
critical medium to communicate on both levels and, therefore, becomes an important 
component of a social movement’s communication strategy.   
In addition to grievances being made known, they must also be recognized and 
proliferated locally among the citizenry and inhabitants of a particular community.  
While writing mostly about the food protests of pre-industrial Europe, Walton and 
Seddon argue that the aim of riots were “to solve short-run problems of supply and price, 
restore normality to markets, activate relief measures by local officials, or remind 
merchants of their obligations to consumers.”106  Accordingly, the aims of riots were 
generated, sustained, and often resolved at the local level.  The necessity of localized 
issues and grievances is evidenced in the participants of riot and protests; those that were 
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affected were the ones that participated.  In Europe, for example, women often initiated 
and participated in food riots because, among other reasons, they were familiar with the 
local markets, prices, and “practices of food dealers.”107  The objects of riots and 
protests, therefore, had to directly affect the populace, be tangible, and local; riot or 
protest episodes did not appear because of issues that occurred outside the localized area 
or due to abstract grievances.  While different theories—such as resource mobilization—
often dispute the importance of grievances in social movement organizations, Edward J. 
Walsh suggests that many theorists agree that “shared grievances and homogenizing 
ideologies are important preconditions for the emergence of a social movement.”108  
Further, the issue of localized grievances was not just applicable to Western Europe or 
the late-seventeenth century.  Javier Auyero’s examination of relational riots in Latin 
America, for example, found that the “grievances [derived] from everyday routines [and] 
local perceptions of politicians’ wrongful conduct” helped to foment and form riots 
during the early 1990s.109  Ultimately, in order for people to risk participation the issues 
must be perceived as legitimate and genuine reasons to protest.   
Finally, grievances must be effectively communicated through a central and 
organized group or structure in order to be adequately addressed by the appropriate 
authorities.  Framing processes are crucial to a movement’s existence because they not 
only “encourage mobilization” but “are held to be both more likely and of far greater 
consequence under conditions of strong rather than weak organization.”110  The effective 
communication of grievances by a social movement organization, therefore, depends 
significantly upon both the framing processes that they employ and the strength of the 
organization.  Critical to a movement’s framing strategy is its ability to set an agenda for 
a targeted group or audience.  The concept of agenda setting “works by priming viewers, 
highlighting certain issues and identifying them as important while neglecting others” so 
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that the audience can “infer from the media which issues matter.”111  Effective framing 
processes, coupled with an organized agenda setting strategy, give movements and their 
constituents an effective voice to meet the challenges of authorities.  It provides structure, 
organization, and unity of conviction across a particular group of aggrieved individuals.  
As McAdam et al. indicate, however, a well-organized social movement organization is 
critical to the success of an effective framing strategy.  The strength of the movement’s 
message, therefore, lies in the strength and cohesion of the organization’s structure.  
Media theory supports this and suggests that “antagonists with a high level of 
organization and resources are in a better position to create news because the creation of 
major events is organizationally expensive.”112  Efficient and resource-rich organizations 
have a better chance of putting effective pressure on authorities, sustaining mobilization, 
communicating grievances, and recruiting new membership.  Integral to the framing 
process is how movements view themselves, how to convince “potential participants” to 
join, and “the ways in which meaning is produced, articulated, and disseminated by 
movement actors through interactive processes.”113  Ultimately, the strength of the 
organization and the way in which they frame their messages is critical to the survival of 
the movement. 
C. ROLE OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS IN DEMOCRACIES 
What roles do social movement organizations perform in democratic societies?  
Social movements create and sustain networks containing people with shared values and 
ideas who work together in the pursuit of common interests and goals.  In democratic 
societies, “social movements have become part of the environment and social structures 
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that shape and give rise to parties, courts, legislatures, and elections.”114  Social 
movements facilitate these structures by providing them the resources, membership, 
access, and organization.  As movements grow and become legitimated, so too do their 
ideals and values.  This growth is largely dependent upon recruiting those individuals, or 
networks, which either share these values or are sympathetic to the organization.  
Consequently, social movements—particularly “pre-existing networks”—are critical to 
democratic development because they provide “recruits and resources,” as well as 
provide the “glue that holds the movement together.”115  Social movements and 
democratization also share the same basic belief that “ordinary people are politically 
worthy of consultation.”116  While many scholars debate whether a set of societal 
preconditions—economic system, regime type , provision of security—are necessary for 
democratic activism to prosper, the literature is conclusive over the purpose and utility of 
social movement organizations in facilitating democracy.   
What role does civil society play in creating and sustaining democracy?  Social 
movement organizations are a component of civil society, which can be integral to the 
formation and sustainment of democracy.  Quintan Wiktorowicz defines civil society as a 
“constellation of associational forms that occupy the terrain between individuals and the 
state” and are subsequently “credited with numerous transitions to democracy and is 
frequently offered as a proscriptive remedy to despotic or authoritarian rule.”117  The 
basic element of civil society is the individual, who, through “the art of association,” 
joins a group with other aggrieved individuals to “collectivize… learn norms of 
democratic interaction, and create institutions capable of resisting authoritarian 
power.”118  These institutions—non-governmental organizations (NGOs), charities, 
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religious organizations, community advocates—work together towards the advancement 
of a common purpose or goal.  As such, civil society in authoritarian environments are 
viewed as appropriate vehicles for democratic activism because they “help lay the 
foundations of a democratic culture by disseminating values essential to democracy, 
including respect for human rights and the rule of law.”119  While civil society can have a 
positive impact on democracy development in authoritarian environments, it can also 
adversely impact the process.  This is especially tenuous in the Middle East where civil 
society organizations formed as result of liberalization measures by Arab regimes—
which are criticized for co-opting these organizations in order to exercise control—
instead of being initiated from below, by society, in response to regime aggression or 
repression.120   
D. ARAB SOCIAL MOVEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
What are the challenges in the Middle East that constrain the formation of a 
democratic society?  There are several factors that hamper democratic activism by social 
movements in the region.  First, the enduring legacy of colonialism has negatively 
impacted Western “experiments in political liberation” in the region because of the 
distrust associated with foreign led initiatives.121  With the colonial experience still in the 
not-too-distant past, foreign intervention into any democratic process is viewed with 
skepticism and doubt.  Second, the region “has no prolonged prior experience with 
democracy that might have in place the institutional foundations for popular 
mobilization.”122 While the necessity of democratic preconditions to be in place in order 
for democracy to succeed is a widely debated subject, it remains that the region lacks 
substantial experience with institutions that support democratic activism.  Finally, tribal 
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networks present challenges to the establishment of civil and social organizations 
working towards democratic development.  Olivier Roy observes that “traditional 
society” leaders will inhibit development of civil society by using “their own power and 
influence to appropriate for [them] the development programmes in order to re-install 
themselves as the ‘real’ people.”123   
Islamist movements also present a unique challenge to democratic activism 
because of its religious emphasis.  These movements are among the most effective and 
well-organized social movement organizations in the Middle East.  Replacing leftist 
political parties and national liberation movements of the twentieth century, the Islamists 
success is directly related to their adherence to the basic tenets of an effective social 
movement organization structure; they are well established in society, recognize the value 
of organization, and “are able to mobilize considerable constituencies.”124  These 
attributes, however, are concerning for many Arab, secular and Western governments 
because of the uncertainty associated with the “Islamic” portion of Islamist movements.  
Many terrorists and extremist organizations use Islam as a platform for jihad or espousing 
a return to an Islamic Caliphate, which has created uneasiness towards any form of 
political Islam.  Jillian Schwedler notes that the recent distinction between “moderate” 
and “radical” Islamists, where the former is willing to work within the existing political 
system and the latter through revolution, has helped to dispel much of the mystery 
associated with Islamism.125  Another challenge associated with Islamists is the United 
States’ involvement in support for democratic activism and transition in the region.  
Democratic support or overtures by the United States is often view as propaganda and  
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disingenuous due to their continued support for authoritarian regimes and the “negligible 
resources allocated to democratization relative to those spent on… military initiatives” in 
the region.126    
E. CONCLUSION 
The evolution of social movement theory provides a necessary background for the 
understanding of what motivates people to collective act together in pursuit of a common 
interest or goal.  While the reasons for mobilization vary, there emerged a distinct set of 
advantages that inspired individuals towards collective action; grievances and their 
impact on a population, communication to both the public and the authorities, and the 
effectiveness of an organization to address with the authorities.  Grievances must be 
localized and directly affect potential participants in order for them to risk participation.  
Additionally, organizations must be able to communicate these injustices to other 
effected populations, as well as to the authorities.  The ability of an organization to 
effectively operate is directly related to the strength of its structure, resources, and 
organization.  Social movement organizations and civil society are also a critical element 
to the formation and sustainment of democracy.  They provide the membership, 
resources, networks, and collective experience from working together as an organization.  
While there are many challenges to democracy formation in the Middle East—colonial 
legacy, competing networks, and the role of Islam—there are established social 
organizations, which offer the potential for reform.   
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IV. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE MEDIA 
There is a critical link between the media, social movement organizations, and 
democratic activism.  The media plays an important role for social movement 
organizations by advertising their grievances, promoting internal and external 
communication, influencing the action of authorities, and providing a forum for setting an 
agenda for debate.  Additionally, the media is also an integral part of the “dynamics of 
democratization by reducing the isolation of movements for political change and by 
facilitating detours around obstructions created by governments.”127  Similarly, social 
movements are an appropriate organization to implement and maintain democracy 
because they rally around issues and grievances that impact the populace, highlight 
localized issues and injustices, and possess the resources, organization, and skills 
necessary to effectively address the authorities.  Naomi Sakr acknowledges that “freedom 
on information should be a catalyst for all aspects of development by creating public 
awareness and encouraging transparent decision-making” while at the same time 
“increasing the channels through which information flows.”128  These mutually beneficial 
links provide opportunity, space, and efficient resource management.   
A. SOCIAL MOVEMENT MEDIA STRATEGIES 
What strategies are employed by social movement organizations to frame and 
communicate their messages in a particular media environment?  Social movements 
utilize a variety of strategies to effectively communicate their message within the media.  
The decision on how movements communicate their message depends, in part, on the 
social, political and media environment in which they operate.  Social movements utilize 
three different media strategies to communicate their views to both the internal 
participants within their organization and to the larger, broader external audience.  First, 
social movements will work to reform the mainstream media in order to present an 
                                                 
127 Seib, “New Media and Democratization,” 2. 
128 Naomi Sakr, “Satellite Television and Development in the Middle East,” Middle East Report 210 
(Spring 1999): 6. 
 42
impartial and open-minded presentation of news coverage.  Movements must work to 
alter the various influences—government, economic, special interest—that shape the 
media’s coverage and framing of issues.  This is a time consuming process and, as Peter 
Brinson acknowledges, “is a long term strategy and [therefore] may not be appealing to 
many social movements.”129  Second, movements will work within the existing media 
structure in an attempt to gain attention and communicate their views.  The success of 
organizations to present their frame of a particular issue or event in the media, however, 
is directly related to their “resources, organization, professionalism, coordination, and 
strategic planning of a movement.”130  Organizations must continually establish and 
develop relations and connections and work to construct a message that is beneficial to 
both the movement and the media.  Finally, social movement organizations may 
“circumvent mainstream media altogether by using alternative media to 
communicate.”131  Brinson suggests that this may be the preferred strategy because social 
movement organizations can produce and frame their own media coverage, locate and 
identify other outlets and organizations sympathetic to their cause, and utilize emerging 
technologies, such as the internet or other evolving technologies, to altogether bypass 
mainstream mediums.132  Social movement organizations can use alternate media forms 
to communicate messages to a wider audience without overt repression from authorities.  
For example, in response to an increasingly hostile media environment and other 
repressive measures, Islamists are utilizing the internet to communicate information, 
promote media activism, and support candidates in elections.133 Pete Ajemian recognizes 
that new media—such as internet networking and blogs—in repressive environments 
allow for “individual grass roots political journalism [which] facilitates the creation of a 
counter-public sphere of discourse that has the potential to penetrate mainstream 
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media.”134 Ultimately, regardless of the strategies utilized by social movement 
organizations, success will be measured based upon whether the frames portrayed are 
viewed as favorable by the targeted audience or participants.   
Given the various strategies employed by social movement organizations, does 
the media provide coverage that benefits a social movement organization?  Peter Brinson 
notes that media coverage can aid or deter in mobilization, provide an opportunity for 
SMOs to enter into public debate or discussion, effect internal and external movement 
dynamics, alter movement trajectories, and influence actions by authorities.135  The 
methods and strategies that a social movement utilizes to communicate its message, 
however, will depend largely upon both the media and political environment in which it 
operates.  Additionally, social movements need the media in order to reach their 
constituents, legitimate their issues, and to enlarge the scope of their message.136  Those 
who advocate working within the existing media structure generally view the media—
mainstream or otherwise—as a necessary means to generate exposure and create 
opportunity for social movement organizations.  The coverage that the media provides 
also works to validate the movement’s status as a credible organization, while at the same 
time legitimizing their grievances and concerns.  The media also provides an essential 
medium to communicate a particular movement’s message to a wide audience.  While the 
“ownership and consumption patterns” of the mainstream media are established and 
usually more resistant to conform to the demands of change, their “content and 
programming are far more dynamic,” which, subsequently, becomes a potential 
opportunity for social movement organizations to target.137  As Carroll and Ratner 
conclude, “social movement organizations must overcome or at least cope creatively with 
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their asymmetrical dependency upon the mass media if they are to be successful.”138   
Ultimately, ownership and consumption patterns are constraints that movements must 
learn to endure and operate within while simultaneously working to integrate their 
message into the existing media’s format.          
Social movement organizations can utilize the media to exploit and capitalize 
upon repressive actions conducted by authorities.  Hess and Martin’s work on the 
phenomenon of repression and backfire highlight a more subtle approach for social 
movements to use the media to their advantage.  Backfire is a “public reaction of outrage 
to an event that is publicized and perceived as unjust” and it usually occurs “around 
censorship, police brutality, or other kinds of repressive events that are perceived as 
unjust and generate public concern.”139  Backfire creates a situation where authorities are 
forced to acknowledge and defend their actions, which the general public may perceive as 
either excessive or repressive.  This creates what Hess and Martin term as “legitimation 
battles” between authorities and movement leaders and generates a potential opportunity 
for social movement organizations to exploit to their advantage.  The opportunities these 
“battles” create become critical to a movement’s existence as it “may defuse public 
opposition or open political opportunities for mobilization.”140  The media plays a critical 
role as it provides the coverage, communicates the information, and arbitrates the various 
actions and episodes on both sides to the general audience.   
What type of media coverage benefits social movement organizations and civil 
society that are working towards democratic activism?  The media must cover events and 
issues that directly affect the population.  The media’s coverage of local, contentious 
issues and events serves to inform the public.  This creates recognition of grievances and 
issues among the affected community while also serving as notification to those in power 
of the debate.  Social movements can aid the media by utilizing collective resources and 
skill in order to present their frame and establish an agenda, which is beneficial to their 
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cause.  While the frame may be altered, both the media and social movements need to be 
proactive in setting an agenda that will be beneficial towards democratic transition.141  
The organizational and skill level of a movement is directly related to the way it is 
perceived by both a prospective audience and the media; better equipped and prepared 
organizations have an increased opportunity in producing a preferred frame.  
Additionally, the lack of media coverage on contentious issues is also a tactic that can 
benefit social movements.  By remaining silent on issues that detract from a particular 
movement’s message, groups “can position itself as a moderate voice in a polemic debate 
and, in turn, bolster its political and public legitimacy.”142   
Do the media undermine the efforts, agendas, and frames that benefit social 
movement organizations?  Social movements participate or stage events—such as 
protests, sit-ins, and demonstrations—in part to attract attention to their grievances and 
recruit those sympathetic to their cause.  They often rely on the media as the vehicle to 
broadcast these episodes, which will, ideally, provide coverage that will benefit both their 
organization’s agenda and membership.  The media’s coverage of these events, however, 
often counteracts or undermines social movements because of inherent media “logics that 
are independent of and often contradictory to movement agendas.”143  Selection bias—
the media’s presentation of only a small set of events from a larger collection—and 
description bias—the way an event is presented—forms the “logics” that work against 
social movements.144  Additionally, social movements also have trouble distinguishing 
and advertising their organization amongst the many narratives, symbols, and frames 
portrayed by other competing organizations; this further complicates matters as 
movements try to navigate through the various biases present in the media.  The wide 
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variety of media resources has made it “extremely difficult, perhaps unimaginable, for an 
opposition movement to define itself and its world view, to build up an infrastructure of 
self-generated cultural institutions, outside the dominant culture.”145  These challenges 
impact a social movement organizations ability to effectively operate in certain media 
environments. 
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE MIDDLE EAST MEDIA 
How is the Arab media evolving from its problematic past into a credible and 
reliable medium for information?  The introduction of new communication technologies 
into the Middle East region has begun to rapidly transform the media landscape.  
Specifically, satellite communication, the internet, and wireless devices have forced both 
Arab regimes and media outlets to reconsider their respective roles given society’s 
greater access to information.  With information pouring in from across the region and 
from around the world, Arab regimes can no longer monopolize or control the flow of 
information to both their people and the greater global audience.  Whereas newspaper and 
terrestrial radio and television were easily monitored and controlled for content, the 
rapidly evolving communication technologies seemingly have no boundaries.  Writing 
specifically about the impact of the media on the “new Arab public,” Marc Lynch notes 
that “it has already conclusively shattered the state’s monopoly over the flow of 
information, rendering obsolete ministries of information and the oppressive state 
censorship.”146  These innovations alone, however, cannot bring about vast changes and, 
as Philip Seib notes “it’s important to resist the temptation to assume that technology can, 
in and of itself, transform political reality.”147  Media frames, public engagement, and 
well-placed resources, among other necessary requirements, must be actively engaged in 
order to stimulate the social and democratic change process.   
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In what ways can the media in the Middle East bring about democratic activism 
and change?  Media provides people the medium in which messages and information are 
transmitted and received.  There are a variety of factors that will determine how the 
information is communicated; political, social, and economic issues all help determine 
how information is being received and transported.  Thus, media becomes the medium to 
connect individuals or groups, who share similar interests and goals, together.  In the 
Middle East, this is consequential given the nature of Arab regimes with respect to their 
control of the media.  Philip Seib notes that in restricted environments, “freer movement 
of information… works against repressive sovereignty of this kind and improves 
prospects for democratization.”148  Media and the information it transports alone, 
however, will not bring about democracy or social change.  Information, no matter how it 
is transported, “has to be used creatively and with an eye to its relationship with other 
social and political institutions” in order to create change.149   
The Arab media has also evolved from its post-independence period, where the 
media—both print and broadcast—was used to propagate messages that supported the 
government’s goals in an effort to strengthen these fairly new and unstable regimes.  
Studies conducted during the 1970s indicated that issues of pan-Arabism and “ideologies 
propagating anti-imperialism, as well as development plans” were the predominant 
frames in the Arab media.150  With the introduction of new media outlets, mediums, and 
technologies, story frames and issues have shifted toward other themes.  Newer studies 
indicate that issues of “proximity (geographical and cultural), protocol news, and 
personification” are the frames commonly found in the Arab media.151  The noted shift 
from ideology-based frames, which solely benefited the regime in power to the news that 
reported on the happenings of the state - though lacking significant critical components—
is a positive shift.   
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C. MIDDLE EAST MEDIA AND THE PROSPECTS FOR DEMOCRACY 
What issues and events do the Arab media cover?  Violence and war by regional 
and international actors in the Middle East has come to define the images and coverage of 
the Arab media over the past several years.  Palestinian-Israeli violence, the wars in Iraq 
and Afghanistan, events of September 11, 2001, the 2006 Israel-Lebanon war and other 
similar events has “dominated the regional agenda” in the Middle East.152  While local 
issues are covered, the predominance of the coverage is focused on regional issues.  
Regional issues are presented by media outlets for a couple reasons.  First, they are the 
issues, which are common and shared among the Arab audience.  The findings from the 
2008 Annual Arab Public Opinion poll support this as the war in Iraq, Palestinian 
divisions, Iranian nuclear program, the Arab–Israeli conflict, and the Lebanese crisis 
were the most important issues identified among Arabs surveyed for the poll.153  
Additionally, regional satellite stations were the most watched among Arab audiences, as 
al Jazeera maintained the largest share of the Arabic news market for both viewership 
and news choice with al Arabiya making significant gains from previous years.154  
Second, Arab regimes allow coverage of regional issues because it deflects attention 
away from problems within their country.  Kai Hafez notes that the prevalence of the 
pan-Arab coverage on the Arab satellite networks averts attention away from regimes by 
broadcasting “injustices arising from Israeli or American policy and their militaries, 
while often downplaying the responsibilities of Arab states.”155  When coverage becomes 
too critical of their regimes, Arab governments take action against satellite stations.  The 
Jordanian Information Ministry, for example, closed al Jazeera’s bureau for “provoking 
sedition in the kingdom” and “defaming the royal family” after televising an interview, 
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which criticized Jordan and the royal family.156  In Yemen, the Information Minister 
threatened to close al Jazeera’s bureau for “broadcasting stories that are hostile to Yemen, 
its unity, security, and stability.”157  Despite these, the pan-Arab frame portrayed in the 
media is the preferred frame as it reflects common issues and interests, which are shared 
by the broader Arab audience.  As Lynch and other suggest, “whether for ideological 
reasons or for market reasons, the main satellite television stations have structured a news 
agenda that emphasizes an overarching Arab identity.158  Rami G. Khouri comments that 
while the regional media broadcasts debates “about hot issues of the day, such as 
Palestine, Iraq, Algeria, Lebanon-Syria, American-Arab relations, Islamism, secularism, 
women’s rights, and others… they do not have significant impact on Arab political 
culture or decision-making by the Arab elites… because they [media] are divorced from 
the political process.”159  Khouri also notes that debating these issues “retard rather than 
promote real Arab democratization by providing a safety valve and a release of tension 
and emotions through the illusion of mass media liberalism.”160   
Despite the attention given to regional and Pan-Arab issues, local and domestic 
matters are covered in the Middle East media.  Local issues are covered and presented to 
the Arab audience; however, they are presented alongside “the wider regional themes,” 
providing visibility to not only the local audience “but to all other Arabs.”161  Kenneth J. 
Cooper’s study of the coverage of local and domestic issues in the Egyptian press 
highlights the disparity between the issues covered by various media types—primarily 
publicly and privately owned outlets.  Journalists in the privately owned media—despite 
their self-censorship—viewed their role as a government watchdog thereby focusing 
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stories on corruption, crime, and protests.162  The state-run newspapers, however, viewed 
their role as national advocate and advanced stories on the government’s progress in 
education, health, housing, labor, and support for Islam.163  This suggests that the state-
run media advances the government’s narrative on progress and provision of services, 
while the private media counters through coverage of dissent, corruption, and crime.  
Reporting on local issues, especially those that counter the regime’s narrative or official 
stance can be costly as journalists across the region are repressed, censored, or 
imprisoned when attempting to perform the watchdog role.  In Saudi Arabia, the editor-
in-chief of the daily paper Al-Madina was dismissed after publishing a poem that 
criticized the Saudi legal system.164  The Syrian government imprisoned journalist Ali 
Al-Abdallah for over 30 months for criticizing Syria’s relations with Iran and calling for 
renewed relations with Lebanon.165  In Yemen, journalists are subject to dismissal, arrest, 
and violence for reporting on corruption, embezzlement, or criticize the policies of the 
government.166  These are significant because as journalists and media outlets try to 
perform the watchdog role on their respective governments, Arab regimes continually 
block the media’s efforts to act as a fourth estate.  In these cases, the media satisfies the 
requirements for aiding democracy; however, in authoritarian countries, the media may 
be necessary but it is not sufficient.   
Why will the current frames and coverage in the Arab media not promote social 
movements or democratic activism?  There are two issues that impede the media’s 
development into a vehicle for democracy and democratic activism.  First, the media is 
catering to a market demand for coverage of regional issues.  Arab public opinion 
surveys and polls—such as the series conducted by the Brookings Institute—demonstrate 
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that the various contentious regional issues are of great concern to the Arab audience and 
subsequently create a market demand.  While the Arab audience is creating a demand for 
the coverage of these types of issues, this does not mean that there is not a demand for 
coverage of local issues and events.  Second, and more importantly, Arab regimes 
actively obstruct the media through repression and intimidation.  In Jordan, for example, 
“freedom of expression is restricted, and those who violate redlines regarding the royal 
family and certain societal taboos face arrest, causing widespread self-censorship” among 
journalists and media outlets.167  Additionally, the Jordanian government retains the 
power to close newspapers and magazines, actively intimidates journalists, block internet 
sites, and intimidate authors who air critical regime views.168  In Saudi Arabia, the 
government actively exerts pressure on the local media, expels foreign correspondents or 
dismisses journalists and editors when they become too critical, and employs restrictive 
media laws to ensure there is no “criticism of the royal family or individual royals” or 
“calls for substantial change to the political system.”169  The repressive actions by Arab 
regimes on the media’s ability to report on localized issues create significant challenges 
to establishing viable democratic activism.  
The recent emergence of the Arab media has stimulated lively debate and 
discussion among an energetic audience.  This has caused optimism among many 
observers—both Arab and Western—about the democratic implications with respect to 
the media in the region.  Prospects for an engaged “public sphere,” similar to that of the 
eighteenth century salons and coffeehouses of Western Europe, cause many to consider 
the possibility of an Arab equivalent.  An engaging Arab dialogue alone, however, will 
not propel civil society into democratic activism.  As Lynch notes, “the public sphere 
does not depend on the existence of democracy” in order to subsist.170 Many of the issues 
that unite the Arab community and define their shared identity across the region—and the 
                                                 
167 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2010—Jordan, May 3, 
2010, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c0ceaeac.html. 
168 Ibid. 
169 Freedom House, Countries at the Crossroads 2010—Saudi Arabia, April 7, 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4be3c8d40.html. 
170 Lynch, Voices of the New Arab Public, 33. 
 52
world—provide the material for these popular debates; Israel-Palestine, terrorism, Islam, 
and American foreign policy in the region.  While public debate and public space are 
important to the process, so, too, are the issues that inform and define these debates.  As 
such, the issues the media chooses to cover are critical to the formation and shaping of 
these discussions.  As in the Western European cases, the issues need to have a direct 
influence on the participants of the debate so that the grievances can be communicated to 
not only those in power, but to other members of the community who are equally 
affected.  An enlightened community is more likely to participate in civil society in order 
to address the grievances generated by the authorities.  
Given the current bias towards coverage of Pan-Arab issues and regional 
conflicts, the current media environment in the Middle East does not support social 
movements or civil society.  Local coverage of issues provides organizations 
opportunities to serve notice to aggressors and connect aggrieved individuals or networks 
together to garner movement strength.  The transnational media brought the prospect of 
providing “local viewers with news of… local affairs that information ministries were 
responsible for hushing up.”171  Despite the growth of transnational and regional media 
outlets over the past several years, there is insufficient coverage of local issues that could 
motivate an aggrieved audience to action or provide opportunities for civil society.  Many 
of the same reasons that excite scholars over the prospects of an energized Arab media 
bringing democracy to the region are also that same that keeps it away.  War, famine, 
labor migration, and other events in the past that have caused a “widespread displacement 
of people and re-creation of communities with shared ethnic identities or language in 
other settings has blurred social and national identities,” with the media serving as an 
information bridge to connect the separate communities.172  The media is also not wholly 
to blame for their lack of focus on issues that promotes democracy.  The consumption of 
the transnational media by Arabs will impede the media’s ability to impact democratic 
development.  The demand created by citizenry for the type of programming offered by 
the transnational media suggests that the “new media is trying to cater to the market” and 
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“understand that no one is going to watch them especially given the… dozens of 
choices.”173  Additionally, the satellite media’s presentation of events from an Arab 
perspective provides credibility to the Arab audience and is what continues to attract 
them to the medium.174  The media’s focus on regional issues connects displaced 
communities, on the one hand, while simultaneously overlooking events that could 
benefit Arabs in the pursuit of democracy, on the other. 
D. CONCLUSIONS 
There is a critical link between the media, civil society, and democratic activism.  
The public dialogue and space created by transnational media outlets in the Middle East 
has caused many to contemplate its role in democratic transition.  The media alone, 
however, cannot create change; “it has to be used creatively and with an eye to its 
relationship with other social and political institutions.”175  The issues and events covered 
by the Arab media, however, do not provide a significant bridge to connect the three and 
provide an impetus for change.  Social movement organizations must learn to work in 
existing media and political environments to capitalize on opportunities and achieve and 
their goals.  At the same time, there must be a deliberate effort by the media to develop 
an agenda that is supportive of civil society and social movement organizations.  This 
will be a challenge as Arab regimes continue to resist, restrictive laws and measures 
remain in place, and audience consumption continues to drive the demand for the 
programming. 
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A congressional research report written in 2003 outlined issues that should be 
concerning to U.S. foreign policy interest in the Middle East.  Specifically, al Jazeera’s 
coverage of issues relating to Iraq, Afghanistan, the War on Terrorism, and the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.176  Further, the report offered suggestions for U.S. policy makers to 
consider when countering al Jazeera’s “slick, entertaining format” and its ability to 
“project subtly its pan-Arab, pan-Islamist approach” in the Middle East.177  The report 
highlights the complex nature of U.S. policy towards Arab media outlets.  Suggestions 
ranged from solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the favoring of more moderate 
Arab networks to the encouragement of purchasing commercial air time.178  The report 
and its policy suggestions highlight two aspect of U.S. policy: the recognition of the 
importance of the Arab media and its lack of meaningful and effective policy strategies.  
The research in this thesis suggests that U.S. policy makers should formulate meaningful 
strategies that assist the Arab media in de-emphasizing regional conflicts while 
encouraging the reporting of local and national issues—specifically, those issues that aid 
in social movement and democratic development. 
The media in the Middle East is in transition.  It is slowly emerging from its state-
dominated past to something that resembles Western media outlets.  The increase in 
media outlets in the late-twentieth century coupled with the appearance of seemingly 
independent, satellite television stations encouraged many observers to contemplate the 
democratic potential these mediums could bring to the region.  Despite breaking 
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traditional press taboos and creating public space for ordinary Arabs to debate issues 
once too controversial for open discussion, the media has yet to generate significant 
pressure for democracy or aid in the sustainment of social movements.  While these 
expectations have fallen short, all is not lost.  There are many institutions, actors, and 
opportunities that must collaborate together to influence democratic transition.  
Additionally, democratic transitions do not occur overnight and require a great deal of 
time and patience for the process to mature.  Policy makers must continue to support 
Arab media outlets—despite their anti-American rhetoric—and encourage their 
collaboration with social movement organizations and civil society in order to effectively 
pressure Arab regimes to begin the process of democratization.    
B. SUMMARY 
In Chapter I, I summarized the importance of the media for policy makers when 
creating and implementing policies that effect societies, provided a review of available 
literature on the Arab media, discussed the critical link between social movement 
organizations and the media, and offered potential implications to the U.S. policy.  The 
emergence of a transnational media in the mid-1990s, however, brought new messages 
that challenged Arab regimes, criticized U.S. foreign policy initiative, and created space 
for debate and discussion of issues that were once deemed taboo.  Despite allegations of 
fomenting anti-American sentiment towards U.S. policy efforts, the Arab media can be a 
viable medium to aid social and democratic movements in the region.  Policy makers 
need to look beyond this rhetoric and recognize the importance of the media in civil 
society and democratic activism.   
The development and potential of the Arab media has yet to be explored in the 
scholarly literature.  Much of the current literature focuses on the polarizing opinions and 
commentary featured on outlets, such as al Jazeera.  Many confuse this commentary as 
democratic potential for the region while altogether ignoring other important aspects of 
the media.  As such, there is a significant deficit in the literature on the media’s coverage 
of issues and events and its potential impact to institutions and society working towards  
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democracy.  Further research is needed in these areas in order to explore the Arab 
transnational media’s role in creating and sustaining viable social movements and 
democratic activism.   
Policy makers must recognize the critical link between media organizations and 
social movements and their role in developing and sustaining democratic activism.  The 
media provides advertisement of issues, creates space for debate, and provides legitimacy 
to an organization.  These links are critical in the development and sustainment of 
democratic activism.  The Arab media, however, focuses on issues that unite and define 
Arabs as a community instead of covering issues that impact them at the local level.  
While this coverage is stimulating debate and creating opportunities for greater media 
freedoms, it is having minimal impact in benefiting movements and democratic 
development.  It is important for policy makers to recognize these developments for two 
reasons.  First, while the messages that appear may be conflict with popular American 
sentiment or public opinion, the flow of information is helping to open and expand Arab 
public space.  Second, the regional and Pan-Arab issues that appear in the media do not 
support meaningful democratic development.          
In Chapter II, I discussed the traditional role of the media in relation to creating 
and sustaining democracy and the development of the Arab media.  In democracies, the 
media provides citizens with information on the health of its democracy.  It 
communicates ideas, provides a venue for debate, transmits messages, and provides 
access to all citizenry.  In the Western European tradition, the media’s watchdog role on 
government for society was formalized in the coffeehouses and salons of eighteenth 
century society.  As Western democracies continued to develop and mature, so too did 
the media.  The media became an integral component of transitioning and sustaining 
democracy and evolved into its role as a fourth estate for its citizenry.  Current media 
debates focus on the Western media’s ability to effectively execute its role as a watchdog.  
Globalization, corporate ownership, and advertising revenues are some of the issues that 
are often cited as impediments to the media performing its traditional watchdog role.  
Curiously, many cite these same issues—globalization, ownership, and revenue—as 
responsible for continuing to preserve the media’s role in society. The media also has 
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uses in non-democratic regimes and environments.  It is used to communicate to the 
masses, mobilize the population in support of regime goals, and set policy; it is a one-
way communication transaction from regime to the people.   
The traditional role of the media in the Middle East, however, has stifled any 
similar democratic trajectory for the Arab media.  Upon independence, weak Arab 
regimes inherited colonial media systems and subsequently used to them to stabilize their 
frail governments and fragile populations.  The media’s mobilizational potential alarmed 
Arab regimes, especially with the development of radio and television technologies.  
Permanent government entrenchment in the media developed as Ministries of 
Information and other bureaucracies were established to regulate content and oversee the 
media’s agenda.  The establishment of transnational media outlets in the mid-1990s, 
however, has changed some of the attitudes and practices of the Arab media.  There is 
diversity in sources of information and content, which allows Arab audiences to choose 
from a variety of different media outlets.  Media competition has boosted the quality and 
availability of Arab journalism.  Most importantly, the transnational media has created 
public space to discuss and debate issues and seemingly created access for Arab 
audiences.  This excites many observers because of the democratic implications involved 
when such space is created. 
In Chapter III, I analyzed the reasons for mobilization through exploration of 
several social movement theories and the role of movements in democratic activism.  
While social movement theory continues to evolve over time, there a common elements 
of these theories that highlight the importance of social movements involvement in 
democratic activism.  Grievances must be localized and impact potential movement 
participants; people need to feel aggrieved in order to risk movement participation.  A 
movement’s ability to effectively operate in repressive environments is directly related to 
the strength of its organization, amount of resources, and efficient structure.  Participants 
will not join disorganized movements nor will authorities or other external actors—the 
media—respond to or assist in movement actions.   
Social movements and civil society are critical elements to the creation and 
sustainment of democracy.  They provide the resources, organization, structure, agenda, 
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and access to groups of aggrieved people that enable them to counter authorities and 
work towards common, democratic goals.  Isolated or weak movements find value in 
associating with like-minded and better-equipped organizations.  Civil society and social 
movements are appropriate vehicles for democratic activism because they spread their 
institutional values—respect for law, focus on individual rights, and organization—across 
society.  These are effective in authoritarian environments because they provide structure 
and organization to effected individuals, networks, or groups.   
Civil society and social movement organizations in the Middle East have yet to 
experience the success of organizations in other parts of the world.  There are no 
democratic countries in the Middle East nor is there a tradition of democracy.  There is a 
significant lack of viable social movements and a faltering civil society.  Liberalization 
measures in the region resulted in Arab regimes co-opting these organizations to further 
exert their control rather than to implement institutional changes.  Colonial legacies and 
tribal networks further complicate the region’s ability to implement and sustain 
democracy and civil society.  Islamist organizations, however, are generally among the 
most organized and adequately resourced organizations in the Middle East.  They are 
adequately resourced, adeptly organized and can effectively mobilize groups and 
networks of people towards meeting organizational goals.  Arab secular and Western 
governments, however, are weary of Islamist movements.  The Islamic element of 
Islamist organizations creates an uncertainty for many governments and support groups, 
which has negatively impacted their ability to effectively operate in Arab society.   
In Chapter IV, I explored the various media strategies that social movements 
employ and the connections between social movement organizations, democratic 
activism and the media.  Social movements can benefit through interaction with various 
media outlets.  The interaction between social movements and the media, however, is not 
always balanced.  The media engages with a variety of different actors—governments, 
interest groups, and corporations—who are competing to set their preferred frames and 




effective media strategies in order to successfully operate in these environments.  The 
better resourced and organized, the better the chance for the movement to present their 
frame or agenda in the media’s coverage.   
Examination of the link that connects movements, democratic activism, and the 
media provides critical information on the prospects for change in non-democratic 
environments.  There is a mutually beneficial relationship between social movement 
organizations and the media.  The media benefits movements by advertising localized 
issues, creating space for debate, facilitating communication among internal participants 
and external actors, and providing legitimacy to an organization and its causes.  Social 
movements facilitate democratic activism by providing the organization foundation and 
networks to adequately address authorities.  Accordingly, in order for the media to 
specifically benefit social movements working towards democratic activism, they must 
cover localized issues that impact the affected population; this will connect similar 
groups of aggrieved people and networks while communicating to those responsible for 
the grievances to address the accusations.   
The Arab media—both domestic and transnational—has yet to develop into an 
institution that is capable of providing the means to aid social movements and democratic 
activism.  This is due to the Arab media’s coverage of regional and Pan-Arab issues.  The 
media’s coverage of regional issues is enabled by a demand from the Arab audience—
which are common and shared among Arabs—and the willingness of Arab regimes to 
allow broadcasting of these issues—these detract from local and domestic issues.  While 
these have created public space and sparked debate in many of the transnational media 
outlets, it has done little to stimulate democratic activism or sustain viable social 
movement activity.  The widespread migration of Arab people throughout the region has 
encouraged the marked demand for the transnational media to cover regional issues.  
Likewise, the terrestrial media markets are still subject to the censorship and control by 
the state’s information ministries and bureaucracies; coverage is limited to reporting 
government achievements, cultural events, and ruling family sightings.   
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C. LIMITS OF PRESENT STUDY 
Academic research, theories, and theses rarely go unchallenged and I recognize 
that my offering is likely no exception.  In an effort to recognize my deficiencies, I 
acknowledge several shortcomings in my approach to this study.  First, the lack of 
investigation into the development and impact of alternative media sources—mainly 
personal display assistants (PDA), blogs, or other internet sites—and its ability to impact 
democratic activism.  Second, the development, function, and effectiveness of the various 
associational media outlets, such as Hezbollah’s al Manar, and its impact on movement 
sustainment.  Finally, inadequate attention was given to specific actions by social 
movement organizations to create episodes and events that would gain attention by the 
Arab media. 
The scope of my research was limited to terrestrial and transnational media 
outlets; my research does not adequately address the impact of alternative media 
sources—blogs, social networking sites, and mobile devices—on social movement 
sustainment and democratic development.  These emerging mediums provide 
uncensored, near real-time reporting, and local coverage of issues and events without the 
biased filters found in traditional media sources.  This was a deliberate decision to 
exclude alternative sources of information because these types of media are not subject to 
the same influences that effect domestic and satellite media outlets.  These mediums 
require a different level of analysis and research in order to assess their impact on social 
movements and democratic development.    
The formal media component of associational—religious, political, economic or 
any combination—organizations were not addressed in my research.  Middle East media 
outlets, as do many other international media organizations, contain multiple biases, 
influences, and pre-dispositions, which impact the coverage and reporting of events.  As 
part of my research, I identified reasons for many of these influences and used them to 
explain the Arab media’s shortcomings with respect to providing impartial viewpoints, 
viable support for social movement organizations, and creating momentum for increased 
democratic activism.  I did not include the media sections of associational groups because 
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of the inherent biases towards their organizations.  Because Arabs obtain news and 
information from these outlets, research is warranted into their impact on movement 
sustainment and democratic development.179  For my research, however, I chose to study 
the biases that are common among the majority of all Middle East media organizations. 
As part of my research, I established that the media and social movement 
organizations have a mutually beneficial relationship.  Some may criticize that I did not 
sufficiently analyze and assess the actions of Arab social movement organizations to 
create episodes or stage events that would aid the Arab media in selecting alternative 
frames to the ones offered by those in power.  As previously discussed, social movement 
organizations do have a responsibility in creating an agenda that will attract the attention 
of the media in order to notify other participants and the authorities.  The focus of my 
research, however, was to assess whether the Arab media was reporting the type of issues 
that would benefit social movement organizations and democratic activism.   
D. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
The media has a direct impact on the success of a social movement organization’s 
ability to effectively transmit and receive messages in order to effect change in a given 
political, social, and economic environment.  There is a mutually beneficial relationship 
between the media and social movement organizations; social movements set the agenda 
through organizing demonstrations, protests, and other collective actions while the media 
provides the means to communicate the undertaking to both a local and regional 
audience.  Both groups—the media and social movement organizations—have critical 
responsibilities in this transaction.  Social movements must have access to “resources, 
organization, professionalism, coordination, and strategic planning” in order to improve 
their standing and ensure its “preferred frame will be in the media coverage of relevant 
events and issues.”180  Equally, the media must also do its part in the maintenance of this 
relationship; “for the media to have a powerful impact on changes to the political system 
                                                 
179 Saban Center for Middle East Policy, “2006 Annual Arab Public Opinion Survey.” Both al Manar 
and al Hurra were selections in the “Media Viewership” portion of this survey, which suggests that a 
certain portion of Arabs do rely on these stations for news and event coverage. 
180 Gamson and Wolfsfeld, “Movements and Media as Interacting Systems,” 121. 
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(and perhaps on democratization) it will be extremely important to improve their links to 
civil societies and the political opposition that… is poorly developed.”181  Kai Hafez also 
stresses that the structural changing of the media alone is not enough to change the 
political, social, or economic landscape; “new political and social movements” are 
necessary in order to interact with the Arab media.182 
The research in this thesis provides several suggestions for policy makers to 
consider when dealing with democratic activism and civil society.  First, the promotion 
and continued support of Arab social movements in the Middle East is suggested.  As I 
will demonstrate, a well-organized and adequately resourced organization has a better 
chance of communicating their message to an appropriate audience.  Second, policy 
makers must continue to support the free flow of information coming to and from Arab 
media outlets.  While messages may often appear inflammatory or contrary to American 
public opinion and interests, continued promotion of the Arab media is essential in order 
to provide the means to for aggrieved communities to communicate to other like-minded 
groups and to responsible authorities.  Additionally, policy makers need to recognize the 
importance of the media’s reporting of local issues in the region and acknowledge its 
significance with respect to democratic activism.  At the same time, policy makers need 
to de-emphasize the Arab media’s often provocative coverage of greater regional 
issues—Palestinian-Israeli relations, terrorism, and other regional conflicts.  Finally, 
there must be continued support for research efforts on the Arab media’s coverage of 
issues.  By continuing to monitor what the media is covering, policy makers will have a 
better understanding of the impact of social movements and provide a means to 
effectively analyze democratization efforts in the Middle East. 
                                                 
181 Hafez, “Introduction,” 4. 
182 Ibid. 
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